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Animal Theology and Ethical Concerns 
Richard Wade  
Abstract: A school of theological thought has arisen in recent years that can be 
appropriately named “Animal Theology.” Animal theology takes up the challenge of 
making the great themes of the Christian tradition (faith, grace, resurrection, 
redemption, sin, natural law and so on) relevant to animals. It challenges us to face our 
assumptions, and socially conditioned beliefs about the place of animals in our world 
and salvation theology. It resists the assumption that God is totally consumed with 
human purposes and that creation is simply the back-drop for human persons to work 
out their salvation. It decentres the human person, but notes the appropriate role of 
humans as custodians of creation. 
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ndrew Linzey and Jay McDaniel, two pioneer animal theologians, coming from 
different positions on the theological landscape, have attempted to develop a 
theology beyond the traditional cruelty-kindness ethic. The purpose of this article is to 
review their work and to present an animal ethic derived from Aquinas' understanding of 
natural law. 
The Traditional Cruelty-Kindness Ethic 
The traditional Christian ethic concerning the kind of respect that is due to animals can be 
summed up as follows: avoid cruelty to animals and treat them with kindness; animal lives 
are not considered sacred and hence they have no significant right to life; as they lack 
reason, animals may be reasonably used for human benefit (food, companionship, 
transport, work, recreation and so on).1 The architect of this ethic was Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274). His teaching has influenced the Christian tradition to the present day. 
Aquinas argued that cruelty to animals was wrong because it encouraged people to behave 
in a similarly cruel fashion towards others. In addition, if people practiced pity or 
compassion towards animals, they would be disposed to do the same towards humans.2 
THEOLOGY, ANIMALS AND LIBERATION 
Andrew Linzey, an Anglican, is unhappy with the instrumentalist understanding of 
animals that he believes is inherent within the traditional animal ethic of Aquinas.  
                                                             
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Man Made to God's Image, ed. Edmund Hill, vol. 13 (London: Blackfriars, 
1963), 124-125. 
2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: The Old Law, ed., David Bourke, vol. 29. (London: Blackfriars, 1969), 
225 (1a2ae.102.6-8). 
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According to Linzey, God is calling for God's creatures to be set free from the inherent bias 
against animals in the Christian tradition. Linzey has been writing on the theological 
understanding of animals since 1976.3 He can be described aptly as the Moses of the 
theological liberation of animals. His writings have been at the forefront of challenging 
religious traditions to shift their theological thinking from an all-consuming human 
centred focus to a more inclusive celebration of God's universal creativity. This shift in 
thinking is grounded in a theology that gives a particular account of the value and purpose 
of animals as God's creatures.4  
Linzey's animal theology is prefaced by a theological mea culpa.  He argues that we 
must face up to the dark side of the Christian tradition, and confess its negative treatment 
of animals. According to Linzey, Aquinas epitomises the voice of this negative strand of the 
Christian tradition. A major flaw according to Linzey, within Aquinas' theology, which was 
deeply influenced by Aristotle, is his hierarchical model of creation. Human beings are at 
the top of the pyramid because they are rational beings (“imago Dei”). Animals are lower 
down the pyramid since they lack rationality.  As lower forms of life, irrational animals 
were under the dominion of and subject to rational beings. Hence, animals could be killed 
for food and used for human benefit.5 Linzey describes this view as “speciesist”.  He 
explains this as the “arbitrary favouring of one species' interests over another.”6 
Linzey is opposed to choices that are made “on the grounds of species membership 
alone” and not “on the relative merits of the individual” within the species.  He argues that 
the moral worth of the individual ought to be based on the attributes of the particular 
individual.  The Judeo-Christian tradition is guilty of “speciesism,” according to Linzey, 
because it awards “marginal human beings” moral status even though they lack “the 
normal traits associated with the species.” Linzey does not accept that “marginals” deserve 
special moral status and rights because of being human.  He contests the belief that 
“marginal” human beings, such as the anencephalic infants, are considered made in the 
“image of God” and are identified as possessing the human “essence.”7 
In his later work, Linzey explores alternative voices within and on the fringe of the 
Christian tradition that promote a more compassionate and sensitive concern for animals.  
He surveys apocryphal literature and the stories of saints such as St Francis of Assisi and 
St Martin de Porres  which tell of counter cultural and positive Christian attitudes towards 
animals.8 In spite of this, Linzey argues that the dominant view of animals within the 
Christian tradition is the instrumental view; that is, humanity's relationship with animals 
is seen in terms of reducing animals to things to eat, use and manipulate.9  
Linzey proposes what he calls “theos-rights” for animals. Behind this notion of rights 
is the view that creation exists for God, and that God is for animal creatures. In other 
words, the Creator has rights to have animals treated with respect. As such, if the rights of 
animals are violated, then the Creator is “wronged in his creation.”10 Linzey considers this 
                                                             
3 Andrew Linzey, Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment (London: SCM Press, 1976). 
4 Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology (London: Mobray, 
1997), 12-13. 
5 Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (London: SPCK, 1987), 16, 22, 27. 
6 Andrew Linzey, ‘Speciesism,' 788-792. In P. Barry Clarke and Andrew Linzey, eds., Dictionary of Ethics, 
Theology and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1996). 
7 Linzey, ‘Speciesism,' 790. 
8 Linzey, After Noah, 99. 
9 Linzey, After Noah, 11. 
10 Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 71, 91-98. 
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notion of animal theos-rights to be an antidote to Aquinas' instrumentalist view of animals. 
In that view animals lacked moral status. Linzey's theos-rights view is another way of 
saying that animals are Spirit filled and do not belong to us by right.11  
Not only are we called to respect the rights of animals but we are also invited to be 
morally generous towards them. Linzey presents Jesus as the model of moral generosity 
and compassion as Jesus gave priority to caring for the weak and vulnerable. Finally, 
Linzey identifies the uniqueness of the human person in terms of service: assisting in 
God's healing and liberation of creation. However, moral generosity towards animals, he 
asserts will be costly for humans. Linzey suggests that practices such as animal 
experimentation, and factory farming will require dismantling if animals are to be treated 
justly. 
Evaluation 
Linzey is to be commended for his attempt to present a theological starting point for 
animal liberation and animal rights.  However, rather than presenting an animal theology, 
it seems to me he has introduced a theology of human responsibility for animals. For 
example, his theology and ethics emphasise Christ as the model of moral generosity 
towards animals and the theos-rights of the Creator.  
There is not much evidence in his work of a developed animal theology, apart from 
his description of animals as a “gift from God and Spirit filled.”  He acknowledges that a 
Christian vegetarian ethic is confronted with the historical Jesus because of his eating of 
fish and lamb, and driving the Gardarene swine over a cliff into the sea.12 However, 
Linzey's proposals, such as perhaps Jesus did not eat the Passover meal to the view that 
maybe the Gospels are mistaken about Jesus eating fish, seem to suggest that he is 
smuggling his agenda into a reading of the Scriptures.13  
There are also problems with his attempt to turn to the Apocraphyl texts and 
imaginative Christian stories about animals as sources of insight into animal treatment 
(compassion, peacefulness and spiritual awareness).  Little attempt is made by Linzey to 
comment on these texts in their cultural, social and historical contexts, and he skips over 
the debate concerning their primary purpose. Some of the stories associate animals with 
the “powers of darkness.” Many of the Celtic stories are also examples of human power 
over animals. While the Celtic monks maintained what we might call a conservationist 
ethic out of a motive of Christian compassion, they were not always vegetarian.14 Overall 
the stories that Linzey recalls tell of the saints' kindness to animals and of defending them 
from cruelty.15 This is at the heart of the traditional Christian animal ethic. In this context, 
their purpose is to encourage this ethic in Christians. And it is through the person of Christ 
that the saints reached out to animals in compassion and kindness.16  
Imaginative stories about animals in the Christian tradition have served a number of 
purposes. For example, the Christian bestiary, a literary genre of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries acted as allegories for moral and religious education. These allegories 
                                                             
11 Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals. 82. 
12 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (London, SCK Press, 1994), 133-137. 
13 Linzey, Animal Theology, 132. 
14 Another interesting dimension of Irish monasticism is the illumination of their manuscipts such as the book 
of Kells with a fantastic  zoology of animals which appear to be deliberately  unreal.  See Edward 
Sullivan, The Book of Kells (London: Bracken books, 1988). 
15 Helen Waddell, Beasts and Saints (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1946). 
16 Susan Bratton-Power, Christianity, Wilderness and Wildlife, 185, 192, 206, 212-213, 216. 
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revealed the nature of God by identifying the similarity between the natural world and 
God. Animal illustrations also had an impact on Christian iconography, medieval art and 
architecture. At all cultural levels and times animal fables are found. Many similar tales are 
found in the Greek classical tradition (Aesop's fables), the Indian-Buddhist jataka 
(reincarnation) stories, the Jewish aggadah fables and the Islamic tradition.17  
A problem with Linzey's theos-rights is that it falls outside the normal discussion of 
rights language and hence is unhelpful. Instances of cruelty are considered wrong in 
Linzey's view not because of what they do to animals but because of what they do to God's 
rights. It cannot be considered a direct duties approach to animals. Basically, Linzey's 
approach falls in line with the traditional indirect duty ethic that maintains we are 
responsible to God for animals (cruelty-kindness ethic). 
Linzey criticises Aquinas but misses the seeds of development of an animal ethic 
within Aquinas' work. Despite the fact that Aquinas attributes a higher ontological status 
to animals than vegetative life, which has a higher status than inanimate life, Aquinas 
simply views animals as mere things that have instrumental value.  Here is a contradiction 
in Aquinas' thought. 
If animals have a higher value than vegetative life and if an animal's purpose and 
goals have intrinsic value then what is due to animals must be different to what is due to 
works of art or inanimate objects.18 Another problem is Linzey's description of the 
negative strand in the Christian tradition as “speciesist”. Linzey has borrowed the term 
“speciesism” from Peter Singer.19 However, Linzey does note that the term has a number 
of conceptual problems. This is a controversial step for Linzey to take because in doing so 
he has bought into Singer's utilitarian philosophy of personhood. 
Underpinning this notion of personhood is an empirical analysis and Singer's 
principle of equal consideration of interests for all beings that have interests (sentient 
beings and beings that are persons).20 The notion of personhood as described by Singer 
and supported by Linzey is focused on experiences, the empirical capacity of personality 
to relate, to be aware of interests, and have desires and to use reason.  It is based on a 
public checklist of attributes.  This criteria of personhood would exclude many humans 
such as the fetus in the womb, newborn infants, the intellectually impaired, and the senile. 
While a post-Darwinian understanding of species considers that there is nothing 
distinctive about species membership, it has to be remembered that this is simply an 
empirical observation.21 We are not simply on the same evolutionary continuum of 
intelligence, communication and consciousness as animals. There is also discontinuity. The 
morally relevant fact is that the human being has evolved into a kind of being that has a 
distinctive essence or nature, which is rational (Homo sapiens). Human persons are 
normally autonomous, communicate their inner life to another, engage in meaningful and 
                                                             
17 Beryl Roland, ‘Bestiary,' 203-206. In Joseph R. Strayer, ed., Dictionary of the Middle Ages. vol. 2 (New York: 
Charles Scribner and Sons, 1992). 
18 Judith. A Barad, ‘A Tension in Aquinas' accounts between the Ontological and Ethical Status of Animals,' in 
William J Carroll and John Furlong, eds., Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1994), 127-143.  See also Judith. A Barad, Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals (San Franciso: 
International Scholars, 1995), 145-150. 
19 Linzey, ‘Speciesism' 788-792. See also Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, revised ed. (London: Pimlico, 1995), 
6, 9, 18-23. The term was invented by Richard D Ryder.  He first used it in a privately printed pamphlet in 
1970: Ryder, Richard D., “Speciesism” (Oxford, 1970). 
20 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Values (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 174, 191. 
21 Ricardo Guerrero, and Lynn Marguillis, ‘Kingdoms in Turmoil,' New Scientist (23 March 1991): 31-32. 
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insightful conversation about the truth, have a lasting sense of self, make choices and 
express these in language.22 
This is not to deny that we share many dimensions with sentient and higher animals 
(emotions, consciousness, intelligence, caring for young and so on). 
A more inclusive understanding of personhood can be developed from the classic 
definition of a person given by Boethius (c.480-c.525), the medieval philosopher.23 
Boethius defines a person as "an individual substance of a rational nature". This criteria 
and understanding of a person as an individual substance was later clarified by Aquinas to 
indicate that it is the human person as a whole with a rational nature that defines 
personhood.24 It is not exclusively focused on empirically verifiable capacities to 
determine personhood. The human fetus in the womb is "an individual substance of a 
rational nature."  In other words, the fetus is ontologically a person already, but it does not 
have the maturity it will acquire in the years ahead. It is the same person as the adult but 
what changes is the physical size, development and the personality. Personhood, which is 
individual and social, is based on the biological, which is integral to human nature.25 This 
is a non-dualist perspective, which recognises the unity and diversity between body and 
spirit. 
The human person is dependent on creation, God, others and society to achieve this. 
Every individual with a rational nature, and this includes newborn infants who are brain-
damaged or physically impaired, is a person.26 Human nature enables newborn infants to 
grow into rationally self-conscious beings, when they can express themselves in free and 
loving responsible actions. They are the same individuals before the age of reason as they 
are at their commencement. This also applies to people who suffer from forms of 
dementia, such as Alzheimer's disease. The reason we attribute value to these impaired 
humans even though they lack rational self-consciousness is because of our common 
humanity.  We respect the wishes they would have were it not for the inability to express 
their desires. 
Boethius's definition of a person as a substance with a rational nature leaves open 
the possibility of considering other rational substances as nonhuman persons.  Although in 
its original context, the rational nature referred to was human. Future developments in 
zoology may indicate that individual dolphins and chimpanzees for example, have a 
rational nature that measure up to Boethius' definition of a person. However, there is 
currently not enough evidence to indicate that these animals have the natural capacity to 
grow and develop to a point where they exercise rational self-consciousness. It has yet to 
be factually established that some animals exercise purposeful self-direction. The evidence 
cited in support of this is controversial (the use by apes and chimps, such as Washo and 
Koko, of sign language to “communicate”).27 
                                                             
22 For a view that challenges the belief that the difference between animals and humans is a matter of kind see 
Marc Hauser, The Evolution of Communication (MIT, 1997) and Euan Macphail, The Evolution of 
Consciousness(Oxford University Press, 1998).  
23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: The Trinity, ed., Cesalaus Velcky, vol. 6 (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1965), 41-
54 (1a .29.1-3); Summa Theologiae: The Incarnated Word, ed., Cesalaus Velcky, vol. 48 (Oxford: Blackfriars, 
1976), 43-45 (3a. 2.2). 
24 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a29.1 
25 Norman Ford, When did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Paperback, 1991), 77-78, 82. 
26 Ford, When did I Begin?  212.  
27 Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 161. 
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Unlike human beings, Washo and Koko's capacity for perception is limited to 
objects, associations and relationships within their surrounding space and particular time. 
The various amazing reports about animal “communication” seem to say more about the 
ability of the human trainer.  In the absence of more or better evidence, it would seem that 
personhood as it is know is restricted to human nature. 
It is hard to understand why Linzey thinks that linking the moral status of animals 
with people who are mentally impaired is going to further the case of animal rights. It may 
very well be true that some animals are more self-aware than some human persons.28 
However, comparing such intellectually impaired people with animals and labelling them 
as “marginal” undermines their dignity, and is unwarrantable.  
Linzey assumes that it is not possible to talk about the preciousness and sacredness 
of human life without comparing human life to animals.  There is no reason why we cannot 
argue that human life is sacred and also maintain that animals must be treated with 
respect.29 
MCDANIEL’S PELICAN CHICKS 
The starting point for another “animal theologian,” namely Jay McDaniel's is the 
perplexing problem of violence in the animal world. This approach is an attempt to draw 
us away from a human-centred theology to one that has moral regard and reverence for all 
life.30 
McDaniel asks the question: is God present to or distant from the experiences of the 
pain and suffering of sentient wild animals that die untimely violent deaths.31  He answers 
this question by discussing the case study of white pelican chicks, as a representative of all 
suffering animals.  Female pelicans usually lay two eggs.  The first chick hatches earlier 
than the second and is usually stronger.  When the second chick hatches it is driven from 
the nest by the first chick and is prevented from returning by the parents, as they no 
longer recognise the chick as their own.  Few parents can raise two young.  Eventually, the 
second chick dies of starvation or mistreatment.  One view is to describe the second chick 
as a "backup chick" or nature's security plan.32  
In this sense, the parents' and sibling's treatment of the second chick is part of the 
routine process of genetic conditioning that enables the pelican species to continue as it 
has for almost thirty million years. This is a view from outside the situation and one that 
focuses on the survival of the species.33  
What about an inside view of the story; that is, the story from the second pelican 
chick's perspective?  It is sentient, possesses a “natural will to live”, and seeks its own 
                                                             
28 See Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 175, 177, 179.  See also James Rachels, Created from Animals: 
The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 5, 171-174, 182, 197-200, 208. 
29 For a defence of cognitively disabled persons see Peter Byrne, Philosophical and Ethical Problems in Mental 
Handicap (London: MacMillan, 2000), 49-71. 
30 Jay. B. McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1989), 7-8, 14-15.  When McDaniel refers to animals he means animals that are “most like us 
genetically and psychologically.”  See “A God Who Loves Animals and a Church that does the same” in Charles 
Pinches and J. B. McDaniel, eds., Good News for Animals: Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being (Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993), 76-77, 82. 
31 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 15, 20, 29. 
32 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 19. 
33 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 20, 29. 
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well-being.34 The actions of the backup chick show that it is aware of its surroundings and 
its own body. According to McDaniel, this awareness is preconscious and is in a way 
similar to our experience of awareness when we are asleep.35 As a sentient creature, and 
like a newborn baby who is not yet able to speak, the chick has interests.  In other words, 
the chick's subjective experience is more than being a means to an end in the evolutionary 
process.  McDaniel cites the work of the cognitive ethologist, Donald Griffin, who states 
that the recognition of sentience and internal needs in non-human organisms with 
nervous systems is not simply human projection. It is also sound inference from biological, 
neurophysiology, anatomy, behavior and evolutionary evidence.36 So, from the chick's 
point of view, its life is an end in itself and it finds no comfort in the knowledge that its life 
is a sacrifice for the sake of the species. The interests of the chick have been thwarted and 
it dies a violent death.37  
Relational Panentheism 
To answer the question about the presence or absence of God to the Pelican chicks, 
McDaniel introduces another model for discussing God's relationship to the chicks and the 
world. He describes his radical understanding of God's immanence and transcendence as 
relational panentheism.  This translates into stating that God is immanently present as 
Divine empathy to the chicks and yet God's presence is not totally defined by this 
presence.38 McDaniel argues that we can say God, the Holy Spirit is present to and 
suffering with the second chick who is the "least of these” (Mt 25:40).39 God as patient is 
immanent within the animal, feeling the animal's feelings and experiencing along with it.  
At the same time, the Holy Spirit is also present to the first chick, as agent, motivating it to 
satisfy its needs.  God as agent, directs the animal's life and, as McDaniel states, invites and 
motivates it towards its own appropriate form of wholeness.40 
Process theology and the thinking of Arthur Peacock have shaped McDaniel's notion 
of panentheism.  In this scheme, God is not considered all-powerful in that God does not 
control everything that happens to animals in the evolution of the world but God is all-
powerful in the sense that God is the primordial source of all life. Matter, which is invited 
from chaos has its own creative independence and reveals itself as chance and law.41 
As a result of chance, God has no control over dead ends, which arise in nature, but 
“wishes things were otherwise.”  This is how McDaniel defends God as unlimited love and 
empathy in the face of the death of the second chick and of violence in the animal world.  
God is not morally blameworthy for the situation of the backup chick, as matter has its 
own unconstrained capacity to create.  God risked in creating the world and invited it into 
sentient animal life.  
                                                             
34 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 31. 
35 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 20. 
36 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 19, 64-66, 83. 
37 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 19. 
38 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 27-30. 
39 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 14, 23. 
40 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 30, 39. 
41 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 24-26, 34-36. 
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From Wild Pelican Chicks to Domestic Animals 
According to McDaniel, animals ought to receive moral consideration and are worthy of 
reverence and care from moral agents because they are intrinsically valuable.  Another 
way of expressing this is to say that animals aremoral patients.  However, there are 
animals with greater or lesser intrinsic value depending on their sentient capacity for 
greater harmony and integrity and richer experiences.  For example, a tick has lesser 
significance than a dog.42 While McDaniel claims a general pre-existent type of sentience 
for all creation, he believes that only individual sentient animals with needs have moral 
rights and receive God's love. However, these animal moral rights (life, liberty and 
happiness) which rely on human moral agents for their effectiveness are not absolute.  For 
example, the rights of domestic and laboratory animals may be overridden if it is essential 
for the survival of humans and other species.43 
McDaniel states that in a world where lamentation is endless and where the 
predator-prey dimension of nature is a broken process we are called to embrace life-
centred moral virtues.  These are reverence for life, non-injury and the exercise of active 
good will.  If redemption is a possibility for the pelican, in what sense, asks McDaniel, can 
God redeem the chick?44 The best meaning of redemption, suggests McDaniel, is that the 
second chick will enjoy the satisfaction of those basic needs in "some sort of renewal after 
death".  The hope is that the chick's brokenness in this life will be transformed and 
renewed beyond death in a pelican heaven.45  
Evaluation 
McDaniel has offered us some key virtues for living a life that is respectful towards 
animals. Unlike Linzey, McDaniel does not simply focus on domestic animals nor does he 
consider animal rights to be absolute. McDaniel has a more realistic grasp of the 
complexities of the animal landscape. He is also prepared to permit animal 
experimentation in particular circumstances for human benefit.  
However, McDaniel's animal theology is not without its problems. His relational 
panentheism with its process theology aims to absolve God as the cause of animal 
suffering. 
 In practice, it reduces God to just another agent in the evolutionary process. Surely 
God is the principal agent who sustains and is ever present to creation, which is 
continuing.  God is not simply there as an invitation to life but is the condition of 
possibility in all of life.  It is hard to see how matter itself can have its own “choice” or 
“freedom” to opt for certain paths rather than others. Another problem that arises by 
focusing on chance and law as the cause of suffering, is that we can overlook and play 
down the role of human responsibility in causing pain and suffering to animals.  Animals, 
also hurt and cause pain to other animals. This is part of the natural order and the natural 
instinct of some animals. If as traditional theology upholds, God is the cause and sustainer 
of the universe, then God is responsible for the way the world has turned out. 
McDaniel's attempt to absolve and defend God in the face of suffering in the animal 
world runs into a further problem of paradoxically attributing the cause of suffering and 
pain to God.  As God in McDaniel's scheme is responsible for inviting the first chick to fulfil 
                                                             
42 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 67-69, 78-81, 83.  
43 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 21, 67-68 
44 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 23-24, 29-30, 34. 
45 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 44-47. 
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its needs, then God is responsible for motivating the first chick to evict the second chick 
from the nest and its eventual demise.  This seems to contradict McDaniel's animal 
theology, where God's nature is described as compassionate and merciful. It gives us a God 
totally powerless and chaotic. 
Traditionally, theology has approached the problem of pain and suffering by 
focusing exclusively on the relationship between humans and God. Theodicy has defended 
the claim that God is good and all powerful in the face of the presence of moral and 
physical evil in the world. This requires qualification, however, by saying that God is not 
responsible for moral evil. This is the evil created by moral agents who are free and 
responsible.  God permits sin to occur through the freedom of humans.  
The creation of sentient animals by God also permits animal suffering and pain too.  
The physical pain of animals is part of the natural order permitted by God.  God does not 
will it. In creating the world God risked and God accepted the consequences of that risk 
which is a world in which animals suffer.  
In this sense God accepts the limitation of God's creation. Consequently, God 
respects the laws of nature, which sometimes cause natural events such as earthquakes, 
bushfires and volcanic eruptions. These natural events can cause pain, suffering and harm 
to animals and humans.  God also respects the “laws” of the natures of various animals 
such as the Pelicans and predator animals that kill and consume animals to survive. God is 
present to the animals in so far as God is the origin and sustainer of their lives. In this 
sense God has a history in animals and is present in their care and suffering. The mystery 
of the suffering and death of the wild victim chick is that it is part of the wise balance of 
wider nature, which is good. 
A serious problem with McDaniel's (and Linzey's) God is that God's love appears 
limited to sentient beings. This excludes many non-sentient creatures such as some 
insects.  McDaniel's theology and ethic is deeply troubled by pain and suffering. This vision 
is myopic, beginning from a narrow empiricist perspective of pain. The fact that animals 
suffer is not an argument for valuing them.  Rather, it is an argument that animals should 
not be hurt.  By way of analogy it can be said that, as food is good for humans then food is 
good for animals.  Pain is also bad for humans and it is also bad for animals.  Pain for the 
animal at the level of the animal's nature is harmful for the animal.  Pain must be 
analogously and proportionately understood in the context of hurting any sentient being. 
According to McDaniel, the more related an animal is to humanity the more we will 
be able to empathise and feel for it as a valuable subject.46  While this may be true, the 
depth of the bonding in the human-animal relationship is also significant. And in some 
societies and cultures many children have greater empathy for their pet mice than they do 
for dogs or chimpanzees.  The problem with linking the value of animals with empathy is 
once the relationship is dissolved, the animal may be considered valueless. McDaniel's 
criteria could also result in some animals receiving better treatment than others. For 
example, since Koko the gorilla is closer to humans on the genetic scale, he could easily 
receive preferential treatment over Lassie the dog or Babe the pig. Since all animals have 
intrinsic value in themselves then they should be treated with respect in proportion to 
their nature. With regard to whether or not animals will die into an animal heaven, it 
would seem that McDaniel has engaged in theological speculation. 
                                                             
46 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 88. 
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ANIMAL ETHICS WITHIN THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 
Another approach to developing an ethic of animals finds its source in the natural law 
tradition.  This tradition has a long association with Christian ethics.  It dates back to 
Greek philosophers such as Aristotle (354-430) and also Roman Jurists such as Ulpian (c 
170-228).  In terms of Christian ethics, this notion is found particularly in the works of St 
Thomas Aquinas.  As a general description it is concerned about fulfilling ones nature. 
Ulpian defines natural law as: 
That which nature has taught to all animals, for its is not a law specific to mankind but 
is common to all animals- land animals, sea animals and birds as well.  Out of this comes 
the union of man and woman which we call marriage, and the procreation of children, and 
their rearing.  So we can see that the other animals, wild beasts included are rightly 
understood to be acquainted with this law.47 
In this definition Ulpian expresses natural law in terms of animal instinct/wellbeing. 
This understanding of natural law opens up the possibility of developing an animal ethic 
within the existing Christian tradition. This same thinking is found in Thomas Aquinas, in 
his account of natural law as the fulfilment of our rational animal tendencies.  Here is the 
“entry” through which Ulpian's insights became embodied within the Catholic tradition. 
Aquinas incorporated Ulpian's definition of natural law (“that which nature has 
taught to all animals”) into his ethical thinking on natural law. In an important discussion 
of natural law Aquinas points out that there are three phases in the natural tendencies of 
the human person: 
There is in man, first a tendency towards the good of the nature he has in common 
with all substances; each has an appetite to preserve its own natural being. Natural law 
here plays a corresponding part, and is engaged at this stage to maintain and defend the 
elementary requirements of human life.  Secondly, there is in man a bent toward things 
which accord with his nature considered more specifically, that is, in terms of what he has 
in common with other animals; correspondingly those matters are said to be of natural law 
which nature teaches all animals, for instance, the coupling of male and female, the bringing 
up of young and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an appetite for the good of his nature as 
rational and this is proper to him….whatever this involves is a matter of natural law.48 
For Aquinas, rational animality also involves the fulfilment of our biological 
tendencies.  Hence, natural law in Aquinas might also be thought to involve plants.  In one 
sense this is true but from an ethical perspective it would appear that plants are not 
considered morally considerable for their own sakes since they cannot enjoy fulfilling 
their own natural tendencies or being frustrated in the non-fulfilment of these tendencies.  
Aquinas's ethics is concerned with happiness and because happiness involves a subjective 
awareness of being content, this would appear to exclude plants.  
However, common sense maintains that animals do enjoy the satisfaction of their 
tendencies at their particular level of being.  For example, animals have biological, social 
and psychological tendencies (sex, procreation, rearing of offspring, food, water, shelter, 
                                                             
47 T. Mommsen and P. Kineger, (eds.), The Digest of Justinian, trans. Alan Watson, vol. 1 (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1985), Book I, 1.1.3.  Ulpian also discusses four footed animals in book nine of 
the Digestunder the law of pauperies.  He discusses what action may be taken when animals cause damage 
when unprovoked. Action could only be taken if the violence was “contrary to the nature of its kind.”  Wild 
animals are not included in this because they are “wild by nature.”  See Digest, 9.1.1.7.10. 
48 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars, 1969) 1a2ae.94.2. Aquinas does not refer to 
Ulpian by name in this text but elsewhere in the Summa, Ulpian is referred to as the jurist. For other echoes of 
Ulpian, see 1ae2ae.94.2 and  2a2ae. 57.3. 
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company, play, and so on).  In so far as animals enjoy these tendencies it would seem that 
animals should be included in natural law under the ethical sense of the concept.  That is, 
animals have their own contentment/happiness in relation to the kind of beings they are 
(dogs, pigs, dolphins, bats and so on). 
In discussion of natural law, the Latin word jus is often translated “Law”. However, 
in classic Latin usage jus means what is right or appropriate behaviour. Following this line 
of reasoning it seems to me that Ulpian is defining natural law in terms of its ethical sense.  
Violation of the natural instinct/tendencies of animals (for example, the infliction of pain 
and abuse, deprivation of water and space to run free and so forth) is against the interests 
they need to fulfil their own natures.  Since it frustrates the animals, such behaviour is 
unethical as it causes the animals to suffer the loss of good they should by nature enjoy.  In 
this sense the ancient Roman natural law, as defined by Ulpian, would appear to defend 
the natural right of animals.  It would require for example, that they be given water or at 
least not kept from having access to it.  It would be critical of breeding programs that 
totally excluded animals from copulating.  Failure to respect the prima facie interests of 
animals based upon the kind of beings they are is to deny them natural justice.  
In line with this tradition, the welfare interests of animals make prima facie moral 
claims on us to behave appropriately towards them.  Claims to food and water, sex, 
freedom from harm, space to run free and so forth are not unlike the notion of rights 
claimed for human beings.  However, given animals' imperfect appreciation of living, it 
seems that none of their claims could ever be absolute. Such claims may be overridden to 
preserve a proportionate good.  For example, the fact that pests (rabbits, mice and so on) 
cause major harm to humans, vegetation and animals provides a proportionate reason for 
killing them.  However, to rightly judge between the competing interests of pests, other 
animals, humans and the environment will require wisdom and prudence. The natural law 
definition of Ulpian and incorporated into Aquinas' exposition of natural law is, in the 
interpretation I am proposing a duty of care for the welfare interests of animals. 
It might be argued that Ulpian was unaware of Hume's (1711-1776) is-
ought distinction and what is called by G. E. Moore (1873-1958) the “naturalistic fallacy;” 
that is, that Ulpian has ignored the clear divide between facts and values.  Hence it is 
unjustified to move from descriptive (factual) judgements about animal capacities to 
evaluative (normative) judgements.  It is often asserted that a bridging principle is 
required to move from what is to commending. However, underpinning 
the is/ought distinction is a particular ideology. The assumption is that moral argument 
and all moral concepts are no longer considered to involve functional/purposeful notions. 
As soon as the concept of essential purposes/function was rejected, it became 
unconvincing to consider moral judgements as statements of fact.49 The initial move in 
ethics is not to embrace the is/ought distinction but to identify for example, the telos of 
human life.  Once the purposes of the human person are identified, then it is possible to 
state that “you ought to do such and such to satisfy your well being.” Moral judgements 
then, express what is considered to be teleologically appropriate behaviour for human 
persons in community.  Likewise, it is possible to indicate our obligations to animals once 
we have identified the distinctive dimensions of the animal's telos.  Respect for animals 
entails prima facie respect for the teleology of animals. 
                                                             
49 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1984), 
56- 58. 
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Conclusion 
Animals are God's creatures.  The manner in which human beings relate to animals and 
take constructive responsibility for them is a fundamental dimension of our relationship 
with God.  Linzey and McDaniel clearly want to go beyond a Christian ethic of “meat 
without cruelty”. However, Linzey's message is too absolutist and ignores the bigger 
picture of environmental ethics.  The political animal ethics of Linzey's theology will not 
survive in the wild. Linzey's liberated animals would be exposed to a different set of 
circumstances and ethics. Indigenous people belonging to the wisdom of the elders 
tradition for example revere wild animals but kill them for survival. Furthermore, animals 
are part of the landscape where they share and occupy space. They have no absolute right 
to all of that space. At times there may arise complex situations of conflict between the 
rights of the earth, individual animals, and the species. For example, if a population 
explosion occurring in a colony of protected bats begins to degrade the natural habitat and 
surrounding vegetation whose rights prevail? It is rational human beings who make 
decisions about the level of human involvement in the wild and whose interests will take 
precedence. However, we must also be alert to our culturally conditioned assumptions 
about animals and ensure that we do not smuggle these into the argument. Furthermore, 
attempts by Linzey to develop an animal ethic are unfortunately tied to a philosophy that 
undermines the dignity of mentally impaired human persons. 
McDaniel tries to bridge the gap between environmental ethics and domestic animal 
ethics.  His animal theology is more aware of the complexities involved. However, 
McDaniel like Linzey seems to be caught up with sentimentalism and an ethic of 
preventing pain and suffering in animals. In an attempt to grapple with the problem of evil 
in the animal world, McDaniel's dalliance with process theology has created worse 
problems for God, humanity and animals. McDaniel's God ends up with no credibility.  
While theologians such as Linzey and McDaniel are pioneers of animal theology, it 
may be that their kind of theologies and ethics are not necessarily the paths we should 
choose. Aquinas's teaching of avoiding cruelty to animals and treating them with kindness 
is a fundamental starting point for evaluating personal stances (eg eating meat) and 
institutions in society (eg animal experimentation). Despite the criticisms of Aquinas' 
human centred animal ethic, there are seeds of development of a theocentric animal ethic 
within his thinking.  I have taken up and developed such an ethical line of reflection. 
Furthermore, Boethius's characterization of personhood leaves open the possibility of 
considering other rational substances as nonhuman persons. 
The debate over a theology and ethics of animals is in its early stages.  And the world 
in which we live encourages its growth.  
